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Abstract Kant is well known for his restrictive conception of proper science. In the
present paper I will try to explain why Kant adopted this conception. I will identify
three core conditions which Kant thinks a proper science must satisfy: systematicity,
objective grounding, and apodictic certainty. These conditions conform to conditions
codified in the Classical Model of Science. Kant’s infamous claim that any proper
natural science must be mathematical should be understood on the basis of these con-
ditions. In order to substantiate this reading, I will show that only in this way it can
be explained why Kant thought (1) that mathematics has a particular foundational
function with respect to the natural sciences and (2) as such secures their scientific
status.
Keywords Kant · Proper science · Objective grounding · Mathematics
1 Introduction
The Preface to the Metaphysical foundations of natural science (1786) contains one of
Kant’s few systematic attempts at finding the notion of a proper science. Kant defines
a proper science as a body of cognition that (i) is a system, (ii) constitutes a rational
interconnection of grounds and consequences, and (iii) provides apodictically certain
cognition. In addition, Kant states that any proper natural science must allow for the
application of mathematics.1 The Preface does not contain a detailed analysis of these
conditions, nor does it explain why we should accept them. However, the implications
1 Kant (1902, IV, pp. 467–471).
H. van den Berg (B)
Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, DeBoelelaan 1105,
1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: h.van_den_berg@ph.vu.nl
123
8 Synthese (2011) 183:7–26
of these conditions are rich. They enable Kant to argue that natural description (the
classification of natural kinds), natural history (the historical study of changes within
nature), chemistry and empirical psychology are improper sciences.
This does not mean that Kant did not take an active interest in the experimental sci-
ences. Recent research has shown that Kant, throughout his life, provided significant
philosophical analyses of these sciences.2 This raises the question why Kant adopted
his restrictive conception of proper science. In the present paper I will try to answer
this question by describing the conceptual background of Kant’s idea of proper sci-
ence. I will analyze Kant’s conditions for proper science one by one and indicate how
they are related to each other. I will also argue that several of these conditions corre-
spond to conditions of the Classical Model of Science as set out by de Jong and Betti
(2008). In the first section I will discuss the condition of systematicity. In the second
section I will discuss Kant’s claim that any proper science must provide a rational
ordering of grounds of consequences. This claim is sometimes interpreted as stating
that any proper science must have a priori principles.3 In my opinion, it can be better
understood as stating that any proper science must satisfy a grounding-relation, i.e.,
provide explanative demonstrations. It is Kant’s third condition, discussed in section
three, that implies that proper sciences must have a priori principles. Finally, section
four will provide an interpretation of the claim that any proper natural science must
allow of mathematization.
2 Systematicity
The first condition that any proper science must satisfy is that of systematicity.4 In the
Critique of pure reason Kant explicates the concept of system as follows:
If we survey the cognitions of our understanding in their entire range, then we
find that what reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to bring about con-
cerning it is the systematic in cognition, i.e., its interconnection based on one
principle. This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, namely that of the
form of a whole of cognition, which precedes the determinate cognition of the
parts and contains the conditions for determining a priori the place of each part
and its relation to the others. Accordingly, this idea postulates complete unity
of the understanding’s cognition, through which this cognition comes to be not
merely a contingent aggregate but a system interconnected in accordance with
necessary laws. (Kant 1787, A, p. 645/B, p. 673, original emphasis)
These remarks require explanation. First, note that the systematic unity of cognition
is said to be brought about by the faculty of reason. This follows from Kant’s con-
ception of reason as a faculty that organizes cognition. In particular, reason logically
2 See, for example, the collection of essays in Watkins (2001).
3 Watkins (2007, p. 5), Pollok (2001, pp. 56–62).
4 This notion has received considerable attention. For recent discussion see Falkenburg (2000, pp. 376–
385), Fulda and Stolzenberg (2001), Guyer (2005, pp. 11–73). My account is indebted to Falkenburg, from
whose analysis of Kant’s theory of science I have greatly benefited.
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orders cognition and thus unifies it.5 The term ‘cognition’ refers to both concepts and
judgments. I will however restrict my discussion to concepts. Second, Kant claims that
the unity of cognition effected by reason is based on an idea of the “form of a whole
of cognition” which postulates a “complete unity” of cognition. Hence, a system of
cognition constitutes a complete whole. Finally, Kant claims that the place of the parts
(cognitions) within a system of cognition and the relation of these parts to each other
is determined a priori in accordance with certain conditions. In the following, we will
see that Kant takes a system of cognition to be constructed by following certain logi-
cal rules establishing necessary relations among cognitions. The concept ‘conditions’
refers, among others, to these rules. In short, a system is a complete whole composed
of parts that are necessarily related to each other in accordance with rules. As such, it
is distinguished from an aggregate.
If we turn our attention to Kant’s discussion of systematicity in the Jäsche Logik,
it becomes clear that systematicity must be understood as a logical requirement con-
cerning the form of cognition.6 Kant explicates this requirement in the Doctrine of
Method of the Logik, which specifies the conditions of scientific cognition in general.
Kant describes the requirement of systematicity, together with those of distinctness
(Deutlichkeit) and thoroughness (Gründlichkeit), as logical perfections. These perfec-
tions provide ideals of scientific cognition.7 With respect to the ideal of systematicity,
Kant remarks that the combination of cognitions in a systematic whole depends on the
“distinctness of concepts both in regard to what is contained in them and in respect of
what is contained under them”.8 Here, Kant employs traditional logical terminology
to elucidate the notion of systematicity. When Kant speaks of that which is contained
in a concept, he refers to the totality of partial concepts comprising the intension
(Inhalt) of this concept.9 Thus, for example, the partial concepts ‘animal’, ‘rational’
and ‘mortal’ are contained in the concept ‘man’. Conversely, when Kant speaks of that
which is contained under a concept, he refers to the totality of concepts comprising its
extension (Umfang). For example, the concepts ‘gold’, ‘silver’, ‘copper’ and so forth
are contained under the concept ‘metal’, functioning as a characteristic (Merkmal) of
these concepts.10 Finally, a concept is distinct if we possess a clear representation of
its characteristics, i.e., if we are conscious of the partial concepts contained in this
concept. A concept is made distinct by analyzing it.11 Kant’s claim that the connection
of cognitions into a systematic whole requires the distinctness of concepts in regard to
what is contained in and under them can now be understood as follows: systematicity
is brought about both by the analysis of the intension of concepts and by the spec-
ification of their extension.12 As such, Kant’s notion of systematicity, when applied
5 Kant (1787, A, pp. 298–302/B, pp. 355–359). Cf. Falkenburg (2000, pp. 376–385).
6 This is also emphasized by Longuenesse. Longuenesse (1998, pp. 149–153).
7 Kant (1902, IX, pp. 139–140).
8 Ibid.
9 Kant (1902, IX, p. 95).
10 Kant (1902, IX, p. 96).
11 Kant (1902, IX, pp. 61–62).
12 Cf. Longuenesse (1998, pp. 150–151).
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to concepts, expresses the conditions posed on concepts in the Classical Model of
Science as described by de Jong and Betti (2008), i.e., that a science S has a number of
fundamental concepts and that all other concepts are composed of these fundamental
concepts.13
Kant’s conception of systematicity is exemplified by hierarchical systems of con-
cepts (trees), proceeding from an elementary concept (genus summum) to more specific
and complex concepts by adding differentiae.14 In the appendix to the Transcendental
Dialectic of the first Critique Kant endorses a similar conception. There Kant pro-
vides a detailed discussion of the logical principles by means of which we establish
systematic unity among cognitions. These logical principles function as rules for the
construction of systems and are described by Kant as principles of (i) homogeneity,
(ii) specification, and (iii) continuity.15 Rule (i) directs us to subsume any concept
under a higher and more general concept. Rule (ii) directs us to divide or specify
any given concept into more particular concepts (comprising subsets of the former).
Finally, by means of rule (iii) we postulate that different levels of concepts within our
classification are continuously related, guiding the attempt to specify continuous tran-
sitions from one level of concepts to another. By following these principles we order
concepts in terms of their extension and intension and obtain a hierarchy of concepts
with the “greatest unity alongside the greatest extension”.16
How should we understand Kant’s claim that a system of cognition should be com-
plete? In the Metaphysik Volckmann it is argued that the completeness of any system
requires (a) the specification of upper and lower limits (terminus a priori and terminus
a posteriori), and (b) principles by means of which all the parts of a system can be
related. Kant presents a closed genealogical tree ordered by the relation ‘generated
by’ as an example of a system.17 Similarly, in constructing a system of concepts we
can specify a highest genus and a lowest species (infima species) and relate them in
terms of their extension or intension. It is important to note, however, that Kant denies
the existence of an infima species. In principle, the specification of any concept can
proceed indefinitely. Infima species are specified by convention.18 Kant also claims
that the assumption of the existence of a highest genus is one of reason, for we can-
not empirically identify a highest genus. Hence, although in constructing a system
we conventionally specify upper and lower limits we cannot establish their objective
reality. The ordo cognoscendi does not necessarily mirror the ordo essendi.
Let us return to the description of the concept ‘system’ given in the beginning of this
section. There, a system was described as a whole consisting of parts. This descrip-
tion secures the generality of the notion of a system, for ‘parts’ can refer to concepts,
judgments or material parts. In addition, Kant stated that a system is complete and
that the parts of a system must be necessarily related to each other and to the whole in
13 de Jong and Betti (2008).
14 The theory of concepts adopted by Kant is analyzed in detail by de Jong: (1995, pp. 620–627).
15 Kant (1787, A, pp. 657–658/B, pp. 685–686).
16 Kant (1787, A, p. 643/B, p. 671).
17 Kant (1902, XXVIII, pp. 355–356).
18 Kant (1787, A, p. 655/B, p. 683; 1902, IX, p. 97).
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accordance with certain conditions. On the basis of our discussion we can now claim
that these conditions comprise (i) logical rules or principles by means of which we
establish specific relations among cognitions, and (ii) the specification of upper and
lower limits of a system. These conditions secure that a system is a complete and
ordered whole.
3 Objective grounding
The requirement of systematicity provides a condition that any science must satisfy. In
the Preface to the Metaphysical foundations of natural science (1786) Kant takes nat-
ural description, natural history, and chemistry to be systematic doctrines. However,
he denies them the status of a proper science.19 Hence, systematicity is not suffi-
cient for distinguishing science from science proper. To make this distinction, Kant
adds a second condition that any proper science must satisfy. According to Kant, any
proper science must be systematically ordered and constitute an interconnection of
grounds and consequences. This condition provides a basis for distinguishing mere
science from rational science, where being a rational science must be understood as
a necessary but not sufficient condition for being a proper science:
Any whole of cognition that is systematic can, for this reason, already be called
science, and if the connection of cognition is an interconnection of grounds and
consequences, even rational science. (Kant 1902, IV, p. 468)
In other words, any rational science is a system of cognition containing a grounding-
relation.20 This condition is similar to the Proof Postulate of the Classical Model of
Science, as described by de Jong and Betti (2008), which states that all non-fundamen-
tal propositions of a science S are ultimately grounded in fundamental propositions.21
However, in the Model a neat distinction is made between the conceptual and the
propositional ordering, and the Proof Postulate is related to the order of propositions
or judgments. Kant does not neatly distinguish the order of concepts from that of judg-
ments. Moreover, Kant takes the grounding-relation to obtain between both concepts
and judgments. In the following, I will try to identify some core elements of Kant’s
conception of grounding by analyzing passages from both his pre-critical and critical
writings.
19 Kant (1902, IV, pp. 467–468, 471).
20 As indicated in note 3, Pollok and Watkins interpret this condition as claiming that proper sciences must
have a priori principles. Pollok further argues that Kant denies that natural description and natural history are
proper sciences because they lack a priori principles. This is problematic because: (i) Kant does not criticize
these doctrines in these terms, and (ii) Kant seems to allow that chemistry, based on empirical principles,
provides a rational interconnection of grounds and consequences (IV, p. 468). More generally, I take this
reading to conflate an epistemic condition that proper sciences must satisfy (Kant’s third condition), with
the condition of grounding, which I interpret as the condition that proper sciences must provide explanative
demonstrations reflecting the order of nature. In terms of the Classical Model of Science, Kant’s second
condition relates to the ordo essendi and not to the ordo cognoscendi. In this context, we may also refer to
Friedman (1992b), who in his discussion of a priori grounding of natural laws interprets grounding solely
in terms of epistemic justification.
21 de Jong and Betti (2008).
123
12 Synthese (2011) 183:7–26
Kant provides an extensive discussion of the concept ‘ground’ (ratio) in his New
elucidation (1755).22 Here, a ground is defined as that “which determines a subject in
respect of any of its predicates”.23 In addition, Kant defines ‘to determine’ as “to posit
a predicate while excluding its opposite”.24 Hence, a ground is a reason for predicating
some concept P of a subject-concept S, while excluding not-P. Cognition of grounds
is a condition for asserting the truth of judgments since it provides a reason for assert-
ing a judgment ‘S is P’ while excluding the contradictory judgment ‘S is not P’. In the
absence of such cognition there would be no knowledge of truths, since all judgments
would be merely taken as possibly true.25 This claim concerns the epistemic function
of cognition of grounds but does not capture Kant’s grounding condition.
In the New elucidation, Kant interprets the concepts ‘ground’ and ‘consequence’
ontologically, i.e., as referring to existing objects. Hence, strictly speaking the relation
of ground to consequence obtains between objects. This relation can be represented
conceptually: a grounding-relation can be represented by relations holding between
concepts and by relations holding between judgments.26 Any structure of concepts or
judgments can thus express an objective grounding-relation. For example, Kant takes
a grounding-relation to be expressed in the judgment “a triangle has three sides”.27
The concept ‘triangle’ provides us with a reason for predicating ‘three-sidedness’
of it because a triangle is defined as a three-sided figure. Kant provides an example
of a grounding-relation expressed by judgments when he distinguishes between an
‘antecedently determining ground’ and a ‘consequentially determining ground’. The
former is a ground of being or becoming, the reason why, while the latter is a ground of
cognition, the reason that.28 For example: the eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter are a
ground for cognizing that light is propagated with a finite velocity, whereas (following
Descartes) the elasticity of the globules of the atmosphere in which light is propagated
is a ground of being for the finite velocity of light.29 The eclipses of Jupiter’s satellites
are a consequence of the finite velocity of light and allow us to demonstrate this fact.30
These eclipses are not the cause of the finite velocity of light. Accordingly, they pro-
vide us with a ground of cognition, not a ground of being, for the truth that light has
a finite velocity. By contrast, Descartes hypothesis that the propagation of light must
be understood as a series of impacts of elastic globules identifies a cause, a ground of
22 Longuenesse has provided detailed accounts of the concept ‘ground’ in Kant’s pre-critical and critical
writings. Longuenesse (1998, pp. 345–358; 2001). Different from Longuenesse I focus on the role of this
notion in Kant’s views on scientific explanation.
23 Kant (1902, I, pp. 391–392).
24 Ibid.
25 Kant (1902, I, pp. 393–394).
26 Many commentators, in discussions of Kant’s views on the foundation of scientific cognition, focus
exclusively on relations between judgments. Cf. Guyer (2005, pp. 11–55), Friedman (1992b). This is not
incorrect but does not do justice to the fact that conceptual orderings can also satisfy grounding relations.
This is the case, e.g., for systems of classification given in natural history, though these systems do not
express relations obtaining between real grounds and real consequences.
27 Kant (1902, I, p. 392).
28 Kant (1902, I, pp. 391–392).
29 Kant (1902, I, pp. 392–393).
30 Ibid. Cf. Longuenesse (2001, p. 69).
123
Synthese (2011) 183:7–26 13
being, for the finite velocity of light. The distinction between a ground of being and a
ground of cognition can be related to the distinction between a demonstratio propter
quid and a demonstratio quia.31 Since Descartes’ hypothesis identifies the ground of
being of the finite velocity of light, his account of the velocity of light reflects the
objective order of ground and consequence and allows us to give a demonstratio prop-
ter quid of this phenomenon. By contrast, cognition of the eclipses of the satellites
of Jupiter merely provides subjective justification for the truth that light has a finite
velocity. In Kant’s terms, a ground of being is the source for the truth of judgments,
i.e., a ground for some phenomenon (described by a judgment) to obtain, whereas a
ground of cognition “does not bring the truth into being; it only displays it”.32
In the New elucidation, Kant took grounding to be a relation that can be expressed
by relations holding between concepts and judgments. This view is retained in the crit-
ical period. In the Jäsche Logik, Kant argued that a concept can be taken as a ground
of cognition with respect to the set of representations comprising its extension.33 For
example, the concept ‘metal’ functions as a ground of cognition with respect to the
concepts ‘gold’, ‘silver’, etc. Kant’s idea is that a genus can function as a ground
of cognition for its species: the relation of species to genus provides a ground for
cognizing that gold is a metal.
I will try to specify how Kant understood the relation holding between ground and
consequence. In the first Critique, Kant explicates the relation between ground and
consequence in terms of logical inference:
In every inference there is a proposition that serves as a ground, and another,
namely the conclusion, that is drawn from the former, and finally the infer-
ence (consequence) according to which the truth of the conclusion is connected
unfailingly with the truth of the first proposition. (Kant 1787, A, p. 303/B,
p. 360)
Kant takes a logical inference to be a function of thought that relates true judgments
and shows that the truth of the conclusion follows from the premisse(s). As types of
inference Kant lists: ‘immediate inference’, i.e., subalternation, contraposition and the
like, and ‘mediate inference’, i.e., syllogistic inference. If we employ modern termi-
nology and strictly distinguish between logical inference and logical derivability or
consequence (which Kant does not), we might say that Kant takes a logical inference
to express a relation of logical derivability holding between true judgments and that
the grounding-relation can be understood in terms of derivability among truths. This is
problematic as the notion of grounding is stronger than that of derivability. Grounding
p means providing an explanative demonstration of p.34 This is not necessarily the
case for a derivation of p. In addition, grounding is a relation obtaining between truths,
whereas (from a modern point of view) derivability can obtain between falsities.
31 de Jong and Betti (2008).
32 Kant (1902, I, p. 394).
33 Kant (1902, IX, p. 96).
34 Cf. de Jong and Betti (2008).
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These two difficulties can be resolved by employing Kant’s distinction between a
ground of cognition and a ground of being. In Kant’s view, the logical derivation of
a true judgment β from a true judgment α establishes that what is asserted by α is
a ground of cognition for the truth of β. However, derivability does not show that α
grounds β in the sense of providing an explanative demonstration for the truth of β.
This type of grounding requires that α specifies the ground of being for what is asserted
by β (as in the case of the Cartesian explanation of the finite velocity of light). It is the
latter type of grounding relation that must obtain between scientific cognitions, since
science must provide objective explanations representing the order of nature.
This becomes clear in Kant’s lectures on metaphysics, the Metaphysik Volckmann.
Here, a ground is defined as that which, if it is posited, something else is posited. Kant
distinguishes between the relation holding between a logical ground and logical con-
sequence, and that holding between a real ground and real consequence.35 The first
relation obtains within analytic judgments, e.g., in the hypothetical judgment “if a
being is an animal, it is mortal”.36 In such cases, Kant claims that the relation between
ground and consequence can be established by means of the principle of identity, i.e.,
is analytical.37 The truth of this hypothetical can thus be proven logically. Such a proof
can be interpreted as establishing a relation between a judgment (the consequent) and
a ground of cognition for its truth (expressed in the antecedent), i.e., a ground for cog-
nizing that animal beings are mortal. The ground of being of the mortality of animals
is, however, not specified by this logical proof. Kant explicates this by stating that
the concept of ground, as pertaining to logic, is “treated in so far it is a ground of
cognition”.38 If we understand Kant’s notion of logical inference as derivability even
this is saying too much. For establishing a relation between a judgment and its ground
of cognition via logical proof is tantamount to providing a ground for the truth of the
latter, whereas the relation of derivability can hold between false judgments. However,
as said Kant does not share our modern conception of derivability, for he takes logical
inferences to be valid only if the premises are true.39 For this reason, Kant thinks
that logical inference allows us to show that what is asserted in the antecedent of a
hypothetical judgment is a ground of cognition for the truth of what is asserted in the
consequent.
Kant’s distinction between real grounds and real consequences indicates that judg-
ments that are not logically inferred can also satisfy a grounding-relation. Thus, α
can ground β even if β is not derivable from α. This distinction prohibits us from
explaining Kant’s notion of grounding solely in terms of derivability.40 According to
Kant, the relation between a real ground and real consequence cannot be established
analytically. A real ground is defined as that which “if it is posited, something else is
35 Kant (1902, XXVIII, pp. 401–402). For a thorough analysis of the notion of ground in the Metaphysik
Volckmann, cf. Longuenesse (1998, pp. 354–356).
36 Kant (1902, XXVIII, p. 397).
37 Kant (1902, XXVIII, p. 402).
38 Kant (1902, XXVIII, p. 399).
39 Kant (1902, IX, p. 121).
40 For this reason, I cannot follow Falkenburg, who explicates Kant’s notion of ‘grounding’ in terms of
deducibility. Falkenburg (2000, pp. 368–370).
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posited, but not according to the principle of identity”.41 Here, the relation is synthetic.
This relation obtains, for example, in the hypothetical ‘if I have been exposed to the
cold, I will come down with the flu’. In this case, a grounding-relation obtains between
antecedent and consequent, although the latter cannot be logically inferred from the
former. In physics, according to Kant, we are concerned with the relation between
real ground and real consequence.42 Thus, judgments of physics that cannot be logi-
cally derived from one another can ground each other (express relations between real
grounds and consequences). The same holds for mathematical theorems, which are
synthetic and do not allow of logical proof. Kant emphasizes that the concept ‘real
ground’ must not be interpreted as a ground of cognition, but as a ground of being.43
This implies that within mathematics and physics we establish relations between judg-
ments that express relations between real grounds and consequences and thus provide
demonstrations propter quid.
The manner in which Kant takes mathematical judgments to be grounded cannot
be explicated within this paper. Judgments of physics satisfy a grounding-relation
because in a proof of physics they can be related in such a manner that they express a
relation between cause and effect, which is an instance of a relation between ground of
being and consequence. This is clear in the Metaphysik Volckmann, where two meth-
ods of proof for the truth of cognitions are distinguished: (i) an a posteriori method in
which one proceeds from cognition of the consequence to cognition of its ground, e.g.,
observation of the world allows us to prove that God exists. In this case, we specify a
ground of cognition for the truth that God exists. (ii) An a priori method, in which we
proceed from cognition of the ground to cognition of its consequence. This is the true
method of natural science which consists in specifying causes of effects.44 A proof in
which one proceeds, for example, from premises expressing relations between cause
and effect to a conclusion expressing the effect would fit this method quite nicely.
In the Metaphysical foundations, natural description is denied the status of a proper
science on the basis of Kant’s grounding condition.45 This doctrine does not provide
“cognition through reason of the interconnection of natural things”.46 I take this to
mean that natural description does not provide demonstrations propter quid. Natural
description is defined as a “system of classification for natural things in accordance
with their similarity”.47 Kant employs this notion to characterize classifications of nat-
ural kinds given in disciplines such as zoology or botany. According to Kant, cognitions
making up such classificatory systems are not properly grounded. Take for example
the taxonomy of organisms based on morphological criteria as given by Linnaeus in
his Systema naturae. If we take this taxonomy to be correct, we are provided with a
41 Kant (1902, XXVIII, p. 403).
42 Ibid.
43 Kant (1902, XXVIII, p. 399).
44 Kant (1902, XXVIII, p. 355). The same conception of scientific demonstration, entitled ‘dogmatic proof’,
is articulated in the Danziger Physik. Cf. Kant (1902, XXIX, pp. 103–104).
45 It must be noted that Kant’s views on the scientific merit of natural description and natural history varied
throughout his philosophical career. Cf.: Sloan (2006, pp. 627–648).
46 Kant (1902, IV, pp. 467–468).
47 Ibid.
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ground for cognizing the truth that, say, a lion is a feline. However, it does not provide
us with a ground of being, a reason why lions are feline. Linnaeus’ taxonomy does
not provide us with relationships holding between real grounds and consequences.
Hence, this taxonomy does not allow us to explain why certain organisms have spe-
cific morphological characteristics. For this reason, Kant takes natural description to
lack explanatory power.
The status of natural history is problematic. In his 1788 essay on teleological prin-
ciples Kant construes natural history as a discipline investigating relations between
present properties of natural objects and their historical causes.48 Causal regularities
relating present effects with earlier causes are derived from the observation of forces
presently operative in nature and inferences by analogy, supporting the claim that these
forces have been operative in the past and have produced similar effects as presently
observed. Since causal relations constitute relations between objective grounds and
consequences, natural history may be interpreted as providing objective explanations,
e.g., of the origin of human races.49 However, Kant emphasized that inferences by
analogy merely provide empirical (non-apodictic) certain cognition50 and stressed
that natural history is a novel science in need of further development.51 This may
explain why natural history is classified as a doctrine rather than a science of nature.
4 Apodictic certainty
The third and final condition that any system of cognitions must satisfy in order to
be a proper science is that its cognitions are apodictically certain, i.e., that we are
conscious of their necessary truth:
What can be called proper science is only that whose certainty is apodictic; cog-
nition that can contain mere empirical certainty is only knowledge improperly
so-called. (Kant 1902, IV, p. 468)
In the Logik, Kant defines knowledge (Wissen), opinion (Meinung) and belief
(Glaube), as modes of holding-to-be-true (Fürwahrhalten). Holding something to
be true is, in turn, defined as a judgment through which something is subjectively
“represented as true”.52 In other words, opinion, belief and knowledge are terms that
indicate different modes of epistemic justification. Kant’s final condition of scienti-
ficity corresponds to what is called the ‘Knowledge Postulate’ in the Classical Model
of Science, which relates to the ordo cognoscendi and states that any proposition of a
science is known to be true.53 In Kant’s work the ‘Knowledge Postulate’ is intimately
48 Kant (1902, VIII, pp. 61–62).
49 Hence, I cannot subscribe to Sloan’s thesis that Kant, from the 1780s onwards, gave theoretical preference
to natural description over natural history. Sloan (2006, p. 629).
50 Kant (1902, IX, p. 133).
51 Kant (1902, VIII, p. 62).
52 Kant (1902, IX, pp. 65–66).
53 de Jong and Betti (2008). The fact that Kant’s third condition, stating that the cognitions of a sci-
ence must be apodictically certain, relates to the ordo cognoscendi, indicates that this condition should be
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related to the ‘Necessity Postulate’ of the Classical Model of Science, which states
that all propositions or judgments of a science are necessary, since he argues that we
only have knowledge of a proposition or judgment if we assert its necessary truth.
Kant describes the three modes of epistemic justification as follows. We have an
opinion if we judge without having sufficient subjective or objective grounds for the
truth of this judgment. In this context, the concept ‘ground’ refers to a ground of cog-
nition, a ground on the basis of which we take a judgment to be true. A ground is
subjectively sufficient for taking a judgment to be true if it is sufficient for myself,
and a ground is objectively sufficient for taking a judgment to be true if it is sufficient
or valid for everyone.54 We opine if in the act of judging we take the judgment to
be problematic i.e., take the judgment to be merely possibly true. Believing is taking
something to be true based on a ground of cognition that is objectively insufficient but
subjectively sufficient, e.g., one can rationally believe that God exists since this belief
“depends on subjective grounds (of moral disposition)”.55 We believe something if in
the act of judging we assert the truth of the judgment. Knowing is taking something to
be true based on grounds that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient. I have
knowledge if I have a judgment that is apodictically certain, i.e., if I take the judgment
to be necessarily true.56
In the Logik, Kant further distinguishes between two types of knowledge: empirical
knowledge, based on experience, and rational knowledge, based on reason. Rational
knowledge is apodictically certain and can be divided into knowledge that is mathemat-
ically (intuitively) certain or philosophically (discursively) certain.57 This distinction
relates the epistemic status of mathematical and philosophical cognition to the meth-
ods of proof employed within mathematics and philosophy. Mathematical knowledge
is intuitively certain because it is proven on the basis of a priori construction in pure
intuition. In particular, mathematical theorems are mediately certain synthetic a priori
propositions demonstrated from immediately certain (intuitive) synthetic a priori prin-
ciples (axioms). Philosophical propositions are mediately certain propositions derived
from (discursive) synthetic a priori principles. Both mathematical theorems and philo-
sophical propositions are apodictically certain because they are proven on the basis of
a priori principles. Empirical knowledge, justified merely empirically, is empirically
certain or contingent. However, empirical knowledge is apodictically certain “insofar
as we cognize an empirically certain proposition from principles a priori”.58
Footnote 53 continued
distinguished from Kant’s grounding condition discussed in Sect. 3, which relates to the ordo essendi. See
note 23 for the relevance of this distinction.
54 Kant (1787, A, pp. 820–822/B, pp. 848–850).
55 Kant (1787, A, p. 829/B, p. 857).
56 Cf. Falkenburg (2001, pp. 364–365). Chignell (2007) argues that objective grounds for knowing prop-
ositions indicate that propositions have an objective probability of being true. This cannot be true if, as I
will argue, objective grounds of cognition must typically be understood as a priori principles on the basis
of which we take propositions to be necessarily true, i.e., have knowledge of these propositions.
57 Kant (1902, IX, pp. 70–71).
58 Kant (1902, IX, p. 71).
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The foregoing shows that the epistemic justification that we have for judgments in
a particular science is determined by the relation of these judgments to the principles
(fundamental judgments) of this science. In particular, a judgment is apodictically cer-
tain if it can be proven by means of a priori principles. These principles are necessary
and strictly universal truths, providing subjectively and objectively sufficient grounds
of cognition for the truth of judgments somehow derivable from them. It follows that
scientific judgments only provide us with knowledge, if they can be proven by means
of a priori principles. In the Metaphysical foundations, Kant expresses this point by
stating that the principles of a proper science must be a priori.
Kant’s conception of ‘proper science’ can now be summarized as follows: in order
to be a proper science, any body of cognition must be (i) systematically organized,
(ii) express relations between objective grounds and consequences, (iii) have a priori
principles on the basis of which the non-fundamental judgments of a science can be
proven. These conditions comprise Kant’s model of ‘proper science’. However, the
Preface to the Metaphysical foundations is infamous for a different claim. This is the
claim that any proper natural science must allow for the application of mathematics,
which Kant employs to deny that chemistry and psychology are sciences proper. In
the final section I will deal with Kant’s mathematization requirement. I will argue that
the latter requirement follows from the requirement that any proper science must have
a priori principles. Such a view is suggested by Kant’s criticism of chemistry. For
Kant argues that because the principles of chemistry do not allow of mathematization,
we lack a priori cognition of the principles underlying chemical appearances.59 It is
because of the latter reason that chemistry is denied the status of a proper science.
However, it is not clear why Kant thinks that the mathematization of a doctrine secures
an a priori foundation of that doctrine. Kant’s view becomes clearer if we take into
account that he takes mathematization to be a necessary condition of the scientific
status of doctrines of nature. Kant takes this view because he interprets mathematics
as a science that provides us with a priori cognition of individual corporeal objects. In
particular, mathematics provides a priori grounds of cognition that ground apodictic
certain cognition of corporeal objects. As such, mathematics allows us to give an a
priori (epistemic) foundation of natural sciences. Before developing this interpreta-
tion, I will first discuss a more instrumental interpretation of Kant’s mathematization
requirement.
5 Mathematics and a priori justification
The requirement that a proper natural science must allow of mathematization is often
taken to be equivalent to the requirement that the concepts of such a science be quan-
tifiable. Kant’s claim that “in any special doctrine of nature there can be only as
much proper science as there is mathematics therein”,60 is accordingly read as stat-
ing that only doctrines dealing with measurable magnitudes qualify as proper natural
59 Kant (1902, IV, pp. 470–471).
60 Ibid.
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sciences.61 Kant’s mathematization requirement is thus simply taken to express the
importance of measurability.
This reading certainly captures part of Kant’s intentions in emphasizing the impor-
tance of mathematics within natural science. In the modern period mathematics was
often thought of as providing a quantitative description of empirical objects.62 Never-
theless, I do not think this reading can explain Kant’s mathematization requirement.
A difficulty confronting the above reading is that it conflates the notion of mathema-
tization and that of measurability.63 It is true that Kant thought that the mathematical
representation of magnitudes enables the measurement of magnitudes. Nevertheless,
one should carefully distinguish the notion of mathematization from that of measur-
ability. In the Critique of judgment, Kant states that we measure natural objects by
assigning numbers to particular objects and that measurement requires the selection
of a unit of measurement. The selection of a unit is arbitrary or context dependent.64
In a purely mathematical context we can, e.g., represent numbers and their relations in
terms of relations between line segments. In measuring natural objects we empirically
specify a particular kind of object as unit of measurement. Hence, mathematics does
not by itself provide a measurement procedure. Consequently, we must distinguish
between Kant’s conception of mathematization and that of measurability.
If we focus on Kant’s argument for the claim that proper natural sciences require
mathematics, it becomes clear that considerations concerning measurability do not
play any role. This argument, contained in Preface to the Metaphysical foundations,
is based on the premise that proper natural sciences are based on “a priori cognition
of natural things”.65 Kant continues his argument by stating that “to cognize some-
thing a priori means to cognize it from its mere possibility”.66 I take this to mean that
cognition of the logical possibility of an object can be gained a priori by means of
the analysis of its concept. However, according to Kant such a procedure does not
enable us to cognize “the possibility of determinate natural things”.67 From this it is
concluded that “in order to cognize the possibility of determinate natural things, and
thus to cognize them a priori, it is still required that the intuition corresponding to
the concept be given a priori, that is, that the concept be constructed”.68 And this is a
task for mathematics, since mathematical cognition is defined as cognition obtained
through the construction of concepts.
61 This view has been endorsed by several commentators. Cf. Okruhlik (1986, p. 313), Nayak and Sotnak
(1995, pp. 133–151). The latter authors assume that, according to Kant, the sole purpose of the application
of mathematics within natural sciences is to allow for the measurability of the objects of these sciences. In
the following I will argue, in contrast, that mathematics provides a priori principles securing the apodictic
certainty of cognitions pertaining to the natural sciences.
62 Christian Wolff, for example, defines mathematics in his Mathematisches Lexicon as “a science that
aims to measure everything that can be measured”. Wolff (1965, pp. 863–864).
63 Nayak and Sotnak conflate these two conceptions. Cf. Nayak and Sotnak (1995, pp. 113, 142, 144).
64 Kant (1902, V, p. 251).





20 Synthese (2011) 183:7–26
In order to understand Kant’s position we must explain why only mathematical
construction allows us to have a priori cognition of determinate natural things. I take
Kant to hold that only mathematics provides us (i) with a priori cognition of natu-
ral objects by means of (ii) singular and immediate representations of these objects.
This reading follows from the claim that a priori cognition of determinate natural
things requires the construction of their concept. In the ‘Discipline of Pure Reason’
of the first Critique, Kant explains that mathematical reasoning is based on the con-
struction of concepts, which is defined as follows: “to construct a concept means to
exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it”.69 The term ‘intuition’ refers to a
particular instance of a concept. In contrast to concepts, i.e., general representations
representing their object mediately (via intuitions), Kant further interprets intuitions as
singular representations that represent their object immediately.70 Hence, mathemati-
cal cognition, based on the construction of concepts, concerns singular and immediate
representations of objects (the term ‘object’ is explicated below). Moreover, since
within mathematics the constructed intuition is exhibited a priori, which is to say that
singular representations employed within mathematical demonstrations (e.g., an isos-
celes triangle) can represent all intuitions falling under the same concept (all isosceles
triangles),71 a characteristic of mathematical demonstration securing the universality
of what is demonstrated, mathematics provides a priori cognition of objects.
With which objects is mathematics concerned? Kant accepts the traditional con-
ception of (pure) mathematics as a science of magnitude. Geometry, for example, is
construed as providing a priori cognition of space and spatial relations and thus con-
cerns continuous magnitude. How, then, does mathematics provide a priori cognition
of natural objects? In the first Critique, Kant argues that mathematical concepts relate
to “data for experience” by means of the a priori construction of figures or images.72
A figure or image is an intuition: it is a particular (sensible and concrete) instance of
a concept. In the Prolegomena, Kant further explains that (geometrically) constructed
images agree with empirical phenomena.73 As an example, we can think of line seg-
ments as geometric images of the velocity (speed plus direction) of corporeal bodies.
Kant thus construes mathematics as providing a priori cognition of mathematical con-
structs, images or models, that represent quantitative features of natural objects. That
Kant entertains this position is not surprising, for his views on mathematics stem from
a tradition that took mathematical cognition to be descriptive of the empirical world.
For example, Christian Wolff, in his Mathematisches Lexicon, defines geometry as
“a science of the space taken up by corporeal things in their length, breadth, and
width”.74 Moreover, since all things occupy space, Wolff argues, geometry is applica-
ble to all such objects and provides cognition of the latter. This position is similar to
that of Kant, for Kant took geometry, insofar as it provides cognition of the structure
69 Kant (1787, A, p. 713/B, p. 741).
70 Kant (1902, IX, p. 91; 1787, A, p. 68/B, p. 93).
71 Kant (1787, A, pp. 713–714/B, pp. 741–742).
72 Kant (1787, A, p. 240/B, p. 299).
73 Kant (1902, IV, p. 287).
74 Wolff (1965, p. 665). On Wolff’s views on mathematics in relation to Kant see Shabel (2003).
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of space, to provide cognition of the formal features of perceptible spatiotemporal
objects. The general conception motivating Kant’s views on mathematics is thus that
mathematics provides knowledge of the formal (spatiotemporal) features of corporeal
objects.
In order to substantiate the present reading we can cite Kant’s well-known claim
that in mathematical problems the question is not about “existence as such at all, but
about the properties of the objects in themselves”.75 Thus, Kant does not attribute
existence to mathematical objects (pure intuitions). In a similar vein, Kant states:
Through determination of the former [pure intuition] we can acquire a priori
cognitions of objects (in mathematics), but only as far as their form is concerned
as appearances; whether there can be things that must be intuited in this form
is still left unsettled. Consequently all mathematical concepts are not by them-
selves cognitions, except insofar as one presupposes that there are things that
can be presented to us only in accordance with the form of that pure sensible
intuition. Things in space and time, however, are only given insofar as they
are perceptions (representations accompanied with sensation), hence through
empirical representation. (Kant 1787, B, p. 147)
This passage conveys Kant’s view that the objective reality of mathematical concepts,
i.e., the possible existence of objects falling under such concepts, requires their pos-
sible application to empirical intuitions, i.e., to perceivable empirical objects, a view
that implies that mathematics yields a body of truths only insofar as it is applicable
to empirical objects.76 Hence, when Kant claims that by means of mathematical con-
struction we cognize the form of objects (appearances), he is referring to empirical
objects (phenomena). Note that Kant emphasizes that cognition of the objective real-
ity of mathematical concepts requires a philosophical justification. The construction
of mathematical concepts in pure intuition (space and time) guarantees their objec-
tive reality if we presuppose that “there are things that can be presented to us only in
accordance with the form of that pure sensible intuition”. This supposition requires the
philosophical justification, given in the Transcendental Aesthetic, that space and time
are pure forms of sensible intuition. Given the truth of this supposition mathematical
construction establishes the objective reality of mathematical concepts. In particular,
by means of mathematical construction we show the possible existence of empirical
objects, the form of which is given by the construction. A different way of putting this
is that mathematics provides a priori models that possibly represent (formal features
of) existing and empirically given natural objects. With this in mind we can turn to
the foundational role that Kant attributes to mathematics.
A nice illustration of the foundational role of mathematics can be found in § 38
of the Prolegomena.77 In this paragraph Kant gives various examples that elucidate
75 Kant (1787, A, p. 719/B, p. 747).
76 On these and the following points, see: Thompson (1992, pp. 97–101), Parsons (1992, pp. 69–75),
Friedman (1992, pp. 98–104).
77 This paragraph had been subjected to a very detailed and subtle interpretation by Friedman, to which
my interpretation is indebted. Cf. Friedman (1992, Chap. 4). I employ § 38 of the Prolegomena as pro-
viding an example that allows us to understand (i) the particular foundational role that Kant assigns to
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the transcendental claim that the understanding prescribes a priori laws to nature. The
pièce de résistance is an example taken from physical astronomy: “a physical law of
reciprocal attraction, extending to all material nature, the rule of which is that the attrac-
tions decrease inversely with the square of distance from each part of attraction.”78 In
other words, the main focus of § 38 is the law of gravitation. Note, however, that Kant
focuses on the dependency on distance of gravitation, i.e., the fact that gravity is an
inverse-square force (1/r2). How is this law prescribed to nature by the understanding?
The first example of § 38 is mathematical. Kant refers to proposition 35 from Book
III of the Elementa of Euclid, stating that if two straight lines intersect one another in
a circle at point E, and intersect the circle at A, C and B, D, it holds that AE × EC =
BE × ED. According to Kant, this law is dependent on the understanding because
it can be demonstrated “only from the condition on which the understanding based
the construction of this figure, namely, the equality of the radii”.79 Hence, the proof
of the above law is based on the condition that all straight lines from the centre of
the circle to its boundary are equal, a condition expressed in Euclid’s definition of
a circle. The second example is construed by Kant as a generalization of the above
property of circles to conic sections. This proposition states that chords intersecting
in a conic section intersect in such a way that the rectangles from their parts “stand to
one another in equal proportions”.80 Thus, the products of the lengths of the segments
of the chords of any conic section stand to one another in equal proportions. If we let
chord AC intersect chord BD at E, and let chord A′C′ intersect chord B′D′ at E′, then
for all conic sections (AE × EC) : (BE × ED) = (A′E′ × E′C′) : (B′E′ × E′D′).81 It
is this property of conic sections that Kant takes as a basis for inferring that gravity is
an inverse-square force.
This choice of inference is understandable if we, following Friedman,82 consider the
Newtonian background of Kant’s argument. In particular, we must take into account
Newton’s derivation of the inverse square law given in propositions 11–13 of Book I of
the Principia. In proposition 11 Newton employs an instance of the property of conic
sections described above to prove that: if a body P moving along an ellipse is subject to
a force f centrally directed toward a focus S, then f is inversely proportional to SP2.83
In proposition 1 and 2 of Book I, Newton had shown that a force acting on a body with
uniform linear motion is centrally directed towards a given point if and only if this
motion describes equal areas in equal times with respect to that point (i.e., satisfies
Kepler’s law of areas).84 Hence, Newton’s proof of proposition 11 shows that if a body
moving along an elliptical orbit describes equal areas in equal times with respect to
Footnote 77 continued
mathematics with respect to physics (which Friedman does not fully explicate), and (ii) Kant’s claim that
only mathematical natural sciences constitute proper natural sciences.
78 Kant (1902, IV, p. 321).
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Cf. Friedman (1992, p. 191).
82 Friedman (1992, pp. 191–194).
83 Newton (1999, pp. 462–463).
84 Newton (1999, pp. 444–448).
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the focus of the ellipse, it is subject to a central force that is inversely proportional to
the square of the distance from that focus. In propositions 12 and 13 Newton proves
that the same holds for hyperbolic and parabolic orbits. Corollary 1 of proposition 13
conversely shows that a moving body subject to a centripetal inverse-square force will
orbit along a conic section. In short, Propositions 11–13 of Book I prove that orbital
motion along a conic section satisfying the law of areas implies an inverse-square
force (and vice versa). Kant’s argument in § 38 suggests that he had this derivation in
mind.
Propositions 11–13 provide us with mathematical demonstrations of particular
equivalences. Kant suggests that these demonstrations allow us to infer that gravity is
an inverse-square force. This is understandable if we recognize that the mathematical
principles developed in Book I provide a basis for Newton’s derivation of the law of
gravitation in Book III of the Principia.85 In particular, Kant seems to envision an
argument along the following lines. Newton’s proposition 11 of Book I proves that
if a body moves in an ellipse and satisfies the laws of areas with respect to a focus,
this motion is governed by an inverse-square centripetal force directed toward the
focus. We know empirically, by means of Newton’s “phenomena”, that the satellites
of primary bodies orbit in an ellipse and satisfy Kepler’s law of areas with respect
to their primary bodies situated at a focus. Hence, we can infer mathematically that
these satellites are subject to an inverse-square force directed towards their primary
bodies. Newton himself employs this type of reasoning in the first three propositions
of Book III, insofar as he applies mathematically demonstrated relations, obtaining
between centrally directed inverse-square forces maintaining a body in orbit and this
motion satisfying Kepler’s laws, to phenomena. These relations allow him to infer
that the satellites of Jupiter and Saturn are subject to an inverse-square force directed
toward the center of their primary planets (prop. 1),86 that the planets are subject to an
inverse-square force directed towards the sun (prop. 2), and that the moon is subject
to an inverse-square force directed towards the earth (prop. 3). These propositions
provide us with the first steps in Newton’s argument for the law of gravitation and
allow him to conclude that gravity is an inverse-square force.
The use of mathematics within natural science described above suggests that math-
ematics can be interpreted as providing models of the physical world, by means of
which we cognize quantitative relations obtaining between individual objects. This
is a three step procedure: (i) we mathematically establish that motion along a conic
section satisfying (one of) Kepler’s laws implies a centripetal inverse-square force; (ii)
we empirically observe that heavenly bodies orbit in a conic section and satisfy (one
of) Kepler’s laws; (iii) we infer the existence of a centripetal inverse-square force. Kant
took mathematics as providing models of physical objects and would have interpreted
Newton’s application of mathematical principles to phenomena accordingly. In this
85 As Newton puts it himself in the Introduction to Book III, the task of Book III is to “exhibit the system of
the world from these same principles.” The locution ‘same principles’ refers to the mathematical principles
of philosophy expounded in Books I and II. Newton (1999, p. 793).
86 Newton does not, however, employ proposition 11 of Book I, but proposition 2 of Book I, allowing us to
use the law of areas to infer the existence of a centripetal force, and Corollary 6 of proposition 4 of Book 1,
allowing us to use the harmonic law to infer the existence of an inverse-square force. For an analysis of
Newton’s argument: Harper (2002, pp. 174–201).
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case, a mathematically constructed conic section functions as a model of the motions
of heavenly bodies, enabling the inference from (i) and (ii) to (iii) by subsumption.
Note that this inference is successful because we have a fit between our mathematical
model and observable phenomena. This need not be the case. In his discussion of
the mathematical-mechanical mode of explanation in the Metaphysical Foundations,
Kant states that this mode is based on concepts that can be mathematically repre-
sented (e.g., ‘extension’, ‘corpuscle’, ‘space’).87 As an example, one may think of
an explanation of density differences by means of the mathematical representation of
varying amounts of empty space interspersed among material particles. According to
Kant we can, then, construct mathematical models on the basis of concepts central to
the mathematical-mechanical mode of explanation. Nevertheless, this mode of expla-
nation is rejected since it employs empty concepts such as ‘void space’ or ‘absolute
impenetrability’, i.e., concepts the object of which cannot be cognized as existing
since their instances are not observable. Consequently, mathematical models based on
empty concepts can not be taken to represent actual existing objects. This is probably
a consequence of the fact that, insofar as these models are based on empty concepts,
they are interpreted in a manner that cannot be adequate to existing objects (e.g., by
taking mathematical points to represent absolutely impenetrable corpuscles). Thus,
although the construction of a mathematical model secures its objective reality, i.e., its
possible application to objects, these models can only be taken to represent particular
existing objects if they are interpreted correctly.88 A possible method to determine that
a mathematical model represents existing objects is via the empirical confirmation of
consequences inferred on the basis of this model (i.e., the empirical confirmation of
(iii)).89
The upshot of the previous paragraph is that we take (correctly interpreted) mathe-
matical models to represent existing objects on the basis of empirical confirmation of
inferences made on the basis of these models. Hence, the use of mathematics within
natural science is empirically conditioned. Nevertheless, mathematics allows the a
priori justification of physical cognition. The derivation of the inverse-square law,
discussed above in relation to § 38, allows us to see this. For the claim that gravity
is an inverse-square force is based on mathematically demonstrated (a priori cogni-
zable) relations. We apply these relations to observable phenomena in order to infer
mathematically that, e.g., the planets are subject to an inverse-square force directed
towards the sun. The latter claim is thus proven on the basis of a priori principles
87 Kant (1902, IV, pp. 524–525).
88 Abstracting from Kant’s own terminology, we can say that a correct interpretation of mathematical mod-
els employed within physics is guaranteed metaphysically. For Kant takes it to be the task of metaphysics
to provide a priori principles in accordance with which the concept of physics must be mathematically
constructed. Cf. Kant (1902, IV, p. 473).
89 Because of the reasons sketched in this paragraph, I cannot follow commentators who interpret Kant’s
mathematization requirement as following from his view that the mathematical construction of the concepts
of a science secures their objective reality. Cf. Falkenburg (2000, p. 289), Pollok (2001, pp. 86–87). Although
constructability secures objective reality, it does not secure that mathematical models are adequate to par-
ticular natural objects. This adequacy is required, however, if mathematics is supposed to provide a priori
justification of scientific cognitions. Hence, this particular interpretation cannot explain how mathematics
fulfils a foundational function with respect to natural sciences.
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and is accordingly apodictically certain. Note, moreover, that it provides cognition
of a specific quantitative relationship obtaining between individual objects. Hence,
mathematics allows us to obtain a priori grounded cognition of determinate natural
things. Finally, we may note that mathematics provides a priori grounds of cognition
of determinate natural things. Mathematical models do not specify (in Kant’s terms)
grounds of being of, e.g., the fact that planets are subject to an inverse-square force, for
this ground is given by the physical force of gravitation. Hence, mathematics fulfills
a strictly epistemic function with respect to physics. Such a reading is confirmed by
the fact that Kant occasionally describes mathematics as an organon of the sciences,
which is to say that mathematics is an instrument for bringing about certain cogni-
tion.90 In short, mathematical demonstration of judgments in natural science secures
knowledge but does not guarantee that judgments ground each other, i.e., express
objective relations between grounds and consequences.
The interpretation developed above allows us to explain, in conclusion, why only
mathematical sciences are proper sciences. According to Kant, it is mathematics alone
that provides a priori insight of specific quantitative properties of individual physical
objects. This is a consequence of the fact that mathematics provides a priori models
(individual and concrete representations) of physical objects. Philosophy or meta-
physics provide discursive a priori principles valid for natural objects. However, in
contrast to mathematics, philosophical or metaphysical cognition is not based on the
construction of concepts. Consequently, it does not provide a priori models of individ-
ual physical objects that can be applied to nature in order to obtain a priori cognition
of specific quantitative relations obtaining between individual objects. This type of
cognition can only be obtained by means of mathematics.
6 Conclusion
The upshot of the final section is that Kant argues for the necessity of applying math-
ematics within the study of nature since mathematics provides a priori cognition of
corporeal objects. As such, mathematics can provide a priori principles for doctrines
that aim to explain specific features of corporeal objects. The foundational function
of mathematics is exemplified in the case of physics, where mathematics provides a
priori principles for cognizing physical laws. Kant’s claim that proper natural sciences
require mathematics follows from the claim that any proper science must have a priori
principles, which is meant to secure that scientific judgments are apodictically certain.
This latter condition, in turn, builds on the condition that proper sciences must have
principles or grounds, securing that they are explanatory. These conditions correspond
to conditions (6) and (3) of the Classical Model of Science. Finally, the condition of
systematicity secures that sciences possess a logical order and coherence, incorpo-
rating condition (2) of the Classical Model of Science. Kant’s conception of proper
science is thus a natural consequence of a classical ideal of science.
90 Cf. Kant (1902, IX, p. 13). Here, Kant further argues that an organon, such as mathematics, anticipates
the matter of the sciences. This claim, I take it, is nicely illustrated by the interpretation of mathematics as
providing (a priori) models of physical objects, providing grounds of cognition for cognitions pertaining to
physics.
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